



ELSEVIER

Political Geography XX (2004) XXX–XXX

**Political
Geography**

www.politicalgeography.com

Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories

Oren Yiftachel^{a,*}, As’ad Ghanem^b

^a Department of Geography, Ben-Gurion University, 84105 Beer-Sheva, Israel

^b Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Abstract

The paper proposes a preliminary political-geographical theory of ‘ethnocratic’ regimes. It identifies such regimes as a distinct type, neither democratic, nor authoritarian. The paper defines and illustrates the evolution and characteristics of ethnocratic states, and examines their impact on ethnic relations and political stability. While these regimes represent themselves as democratic, their main project promotes the *ethnicization of contested territory and power apparatus*. Their logic, structure, features and trajectories are articulated and generalized, especially as regards key dimensions such as: democracy, minorities, ‘ethno-classes’, ethno-nationalism and religion.

Three examples of ethnocratic regimes—in Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia—are briefly described, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the paper constructs a tentative model, identifying six ‘*regime bases*’ as constituting a hegemonic regime core, including: immigration and citizenship, land and settlement, the role of the armed forces, the legal system, the flow of capital and public culture. These ‘bases’ largely determine the character of ‘*regime features*’, such as party politics, elections, gender relations and the media. But the hegemonic status of these bases is frequently challenged by groups marginalized by the expansion and control of the dominant ethnoses. These groups attempt to exploit the ‘cracks’ emanating from the state’s self-representation as democratic. The ceaseless ethnocratic-democratic tension typically results in chronic instability and prolonged ethnic conflict.

© 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Democracy; Ethnicity; Regime; Sri Lanka; Estonia; Israel; Palestine

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +9728-6472011; fax: +9728-6472821.

E-mail address: yiftach@bgu.ac.il (O. Yiftachel).

Introduction

The rapid transformation in the world political order during the last decade and half has generated active debate on regime types in general, and democratization in particular (see: Bermeo, 1997; Diamond, 2002; Harris, 2001; Huntington, 1997; Linz & Stephan, 1996; Keating & McGarry, 2001). Yet, the academic discourse has been unduly constrained by a binary democracy–non-democracy framework of analysis. The emphasis by most western scholars on a formal–procedural definition of democracy, on free markets and on various forms of constitutionalism, caused many to overlook the persistence of an ethno-national ‘engine’ of political change. This has obscured the on-going existence, and recent proliferation; of a regime type we term here—‘ethnocracy’.¹

In this paper, we aim to address the deficiency by focusing on this type of regime. We will define and illustrate a model of what we term ‘open ethnocratic’ regimes, and examine its impact on ethnic relations and political stability. Our theoretical argument centers on the mechanisms of the regime, which explain both the persistent patterns of ethnic dominance and its chronic instability. A related theoretical contribution is the existence of ethnocratic regimes as a distinct identifiable type, which promotes a central (political-geographical) project of *ethnicizing contested territories and power structures*.

We contend that the logic, structure, features and trajectories of open ethnocratic regime can be articulated and generalized, and that the model we proposed below can frame a new understanding of politics and geography in many states embroiled in protracted ethnic conflicts. Such understanding forms a necessary step in managing the typically volatile inter-group relations of ethnocratic societies. In this vein, the paper attempts to make a theoretical, conceptual and practical contribution to the understanding of deeply divided societies, and to illustrate the dynamics of ethnocratic regimes, by briefly comparing the relevant cases of Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia.

Scholarly settings

Our discussion focuses on regimes, which we define as frameworks determining the distribution of power, values and resources. A regime reflects the identity, goals, and practical priorities of a political community. The state is the main vehicle for the regime, providing institutions, mechanisms, laws and legitimized forms of violence to implement the projects articulated by the regime.

Ethnocratic regimes may emerge in a variety of forms, including cases of ethnic dictatorships or regimes implementing violent strategies of ethnic cleansing, as occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo by means of control and exclusion as

¹ The term ‘ethnocracy’ has appeared in previous literature (see Linz & Stephan, 1996; Little, 1994); However, as far as we are aware, it was generally used as a derogatory term, with very little discussion, and never theorized or developed into a model or concept, as formulated here.

happened in Sudan, pre-2003 Iraq or pre-1994 South Africa (Mann, 2000). In this paper, however, we are interested in ethnocratic regimes, which represent themselves as democratic, and uphold several formal democratic mechanisms, although they still facilitate a disproportional and undemocratic expansion of the dominant ethno-nation. They can thus be described as ‘open ethnocracies’. Examples of such regimes at present include states such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Estonia, Latvia, Serbia, and Israel, as well as past cases such as 19th Century Australia or Canada until the 1960s.

Our analysis of ethnocratic regimes ‘converses’ with a range of scholarly debates and a number of disciplinary fields. We present below a combined political geography and political science perspective, which seeks to contribute to debates on key concepts such as nationalism (for key texts, see Brubaker, 1996; Hechter, 2000); ethnicity (see Connor, 1994; Conversi, 2002), political regimes (Collier & Levitski, 1997; Linz & Stephan, 1996); political stability (Lustick, 1993; McGarry & O’Leary, 1993, 1995), multi-cultural citizenship and the postcolonial condition (Benhabib, 2002; Kymlicka, 2001). The knowledge accumulated in these fields forms an important basis for our new formulations.

Ethnocracies: key components

We define ethnocracy as a regime facilitating the expansion, ethnicization and control of a dominant ethnic-nation over contested territory and state. ‘Open ethnocracies’, on which we focus here, exercises selective openness: they possess a range of partial democratic features, most notably political competition, free media and significant civil rights; although these fail to be universal or comprehensive, and are typically applied to the extent they do not interfere with the ethnicization project.

Given this selective and partial openness, open ethnocratic regimes cannot be classified as democratic (as elaborated below). Neither they can be classified as authoritarian, given their extent of political freedoms and openings, which far exceeds the typical range characterizing such regimes (see Linz & Stephan, 1996). The most striking differences between open ethnocracies and autocracies are: (a) the real possibility of government change in most ethnocratic regimes, as opposed to long-term dominance of one ruler or party typifying autocracies; (b) the strong emphasis on ethnic loyalties as a foundation of politics, not found in most autocracies.

The combination of democratic and ethnocratic features makes open ethnocracies a particularly interesting, and not uncommon, case during the current age of ‘superficial democratization’ (Zakaria, 1997). Instability is typically generated by marginalized and oppressed minorities, who often use the partial openings granted by the state to resist, mobilize and challenge the regime. But at the same time, regime legitimacy is augmented by the introduction of democratic features, which possess an appeasing effect on restive minorities. The ethnocratic–democratic tensions in open ethnocracies thereby creates a high level of regime dynamism and

instability, found neither in more oppressive ‘closed’ ethnocracies, such as pre-2003 Iraq or Sudan; or in liberal democracies, such as Denmark or Sweden.

Structure

As elaborated elsewhere (see Yiftachel, 1999) ethnocratic states emerge from the time–space fusion of three main historical-political forces: (a) settler-colonialism, which may be external (into another state or continent) or internal (within a state) (Lustick, 1993; McGarry, 1998); (b) ethno-nationalism, which draws on the international legitimacy to national *self-determination* to buttress the political and territorial expansionist goals of the dominant ethno-nation (Connor, 1994; Mann, 1999); and (c) a conspicuous ‘ethnic logic’ of capital, which tends to stratify ethnic groups through uneven processes of capital mobility, immigration and economic globalization (Sassen, 1998; Soysal, 1994). These settings mean that ethnocratic regime reflect, and at the same time reproduce, patterns of ethnic stratification and discrimination. The parallel workings of these structural forces have shaped several key regime characteristics—all enhancing the process of ethnicizing contested territory. These are²:

- Ethnicity, and not citizenship, forms the main basis for resource and power allocation; only partial rights and capabilities are extended to minorities; there is a constant ethnocratic-civil tension.
- The dominant ethnic nation appropriates the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, geography, economy and culture, so as to expand and deepen its control over state and territory.
- Political boundaries are vague, often privileging co-ethnic of the dominant group in the Diaspora, over minority citizens; there is no clearly identified ‘demos’.
- Politics are ethnicized, as the ethnic logic of power distribution polarizes the body politic and party system.
- Rigid forms of ethnic segregation and socioeconomic stratification are maintained, despite countervailing legal and market forces.

A central point is that in ethnocratic regimes, the notion of *the ‘demos’ is crucially ruptured*. That is, the community of equal resident-citizens (the demos) does not feature high in the country’s policies, agenda, imagination, symbols or resource distribution, and is therefore not nurtured or facilitated. But the ‘demos’ forms the necessary basis for the establishment of democracy (‘demos-cracy’), and as a foundation for the most stable and legitimate form of governance known to human society. Needless to say, the concept of the demos is open to many interpretations, as evidenced by the variety of federal, multi-cultural or unitary state structures. Yet, the structural diminution of the demos by ethnocratic regimes

² The characteristics are worded as assertions which may be subject to further theoretical and empirical validation.

highlights their qualitative difference from the norms and practices of democratic governance. 155

Notably; the ethnocratic model presented here is *dynamic*, depicting and interpreting processes, rather than fixed reality, most notably ethnic expansion, and the challenges and resistance it faces. One of our main arguments is the inherent instability of open ethnocratic regimes, born out of the dynamism of societies embroiled in ethnic territorial conflicts. Let us now explore further the structure of ethnocratic regimes by elaborating on additional key dimensions, regarding territory, religion and class. 156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Territory 164

Ethnocracies are driven, first and foremost, by a concerted collective project of exerting ethno-national control over a territory perceived as the *nation's (exclusive) homeland*. The regime is thus propelled by a sense of collective entitlement among the majority group to control 'its' state, and 'its' homeland, as part and parcel of what is conceived as a 'natural' right for self-determination. But given the perennial existence of multi-ethnic and multi-national territories, the imposition of ethnic control over a mixed territory (and at times beyond) is likely to cause bitter and protracted conflicts generated by rival claims for the same territory made by other groups, typically those controlling the areas in different historical periods (see Hakli, 2001; Murphy, 2002; Yiftachel; 2002). 165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

While geographers and political scientists have compiled many studies of ethnic politics and geographies (see Boal, 1987; Eyles, 1990; Peach, 1996), there has been a relative paucity of studies linking questions of power, identity and ethnic conflict to the dynamics of spatial expansion. Yet, the last years have seen several important beginnings, with recent geographical studies beginning the task of systematically describing, theorizing and offering critical evaluation of ethnocratic spatial practices. 175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Penrose (2000a,b), for example, shows how the very structure of modern nation-states (termed 'nationalist democracies') spawns societal projects, which ghettoize and marginalize minority groups, and at the same time attempts to forcefully assimilate them into the mainstream. Penrose theoretically and empirically exposes the embedded contradiction between the claims of such states to be democracies, and their systematic oppression of part of their citizenry 182
183
184
185
186
187

...systemic inequalities arise when the application of democratic principles is constrained by the more fundamental need to demonstrate that the state represents a single, coterminous nation. Accordingly... efforts to improve democracies must begin with the assumption that the spaces and places in which this ideology operates are not neutral. Instead, I suggest that [under the nationalist order—OY] the context in which democratic principles are applied, and their interpretation challenged, both produces and reflects ongoing, structural unequal, power relations. (Penrose, 2000a,b: p. 35). 188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Likewise, geographers Paasi (1999, 2000), Herb and Kaplan (1999) and Murphy (2002) provide detailed accounts on the historical evolution of the close nexus between identity and territory as a fundamental basis for the existing dominant political order. This nexus provides the normative ‘ideal’, and the political basis for mobilization, which stand behind the making of the global nation-state order. Notwithstanding recent processes of globalization and localization, which erode their power, national states remain the main repository of political, violent and economic power, especially as regards minorities.

Paasi (2000) elaborates on the principles and methods of state building, which invariably include a quiet, hegemonic, process of ‘spatial socialization’, whereby cultural norms, official cartography, military activity and education infuse the taken-for-granted link of people to their exclusive ethno-national homeland. Sibley (1996) and Sack (1993) address the phenomenon of territoriality, with Sibley adding a critical psychological-spatial dimension by introducing the concept of ‘pure space’, as a social desire apparent on all scales. This often contradicts with the dictates of global capitalism, creating a spatial politics of difference, manifested perversely and often brutally, in the planning and making of the built environment:

The built environment assumes symbolic importance, reinforcing a desire for order and conformity. . . space is implicated in the construction of otherness and deviancy. ‘Pure space’ exposes difference and facilitates the policing of boundaries. . . This xenophobia is based. . . on a purified national identity; (it) sits uneasily with the flows and cultural fusions, which are generated by global capitalism. But the contradiction between a racist nationalism and the imperatives of capitalist economies is denied. . . The myth of cultural homogeneity is needed to sustain the nation-state. . . It is convenient to have an alien other hovering on the margins (Sibley, 1996: pp. 106–108).

Based on these theoretical foundations, we can proceed to observe the process of ethnicizing contested territory as involving several key steps: (a) structural *segregation*, without which the expansion of the majority group would not be possible; (b) the construction of minorities as a ‘threat’ or ‘enemies’ to the project of ‘purifying’ ethnic spatial control, embedded in the model of the national state, from which ethnocratic regimes receive their ultimate internal, and at times international, legitimacy; (c) the formulation of public *policies* and practices, in the field of land, development and planning, which enhance ethnocratic spatial control; (d) the structural, and hence enduring, *discrimination* of minorities in the fields of land control, planning rights, development and access to decision-making powers.

The manipulation of ethnic political geographies is hence one of the most central pillars of all ethnocratic regimes; that is, the ethnicization of political space. The legal, political, cultural and demographic ‘bases’ of the regime, as elaborated below, all facilitate this collective goal. But the geographical process in which ethnocratic regimes are enmeshed, also expose their long-term weakness: as shown by the recent work of social and political scientists such as Brubaker (1996), Gurr (2000), Mann (2000), McGarry (1998) and Hechter (2000), the process of

state-led ethnic territorial expansion may and marginalize minorities to such an extent, that their resistance often generates serious threats to the regime, most commonly on a regional or transnational scale. The remaking of ethnic geography is also closely related to another key component of most ethnocratic regime—the reigning of religion to advance the ethnic project.

Religion

While the main mobilizers of politics in ethnocratic states is definitely ethno-nationalism, in most cases, the ‘national’ question is intimately involved with an institutionalized and politicized religion, because the religion held by the dominant majority is often an ‘ethnic religion’. This creates reciprocal relations, where religion is influenced by contemporary ethnic and national struggles, while the nature of the ethno-national struggle is, in turn, shaped by religious motives. The expansive type of ethno-nationalism typical to ethnocracies is thus able to develop resilient forms of internal legitimations, based on the mutual reinforcement of nationalism and religion.

Examples of the intimate connection between religion and ethno-national segregation are rife in ethnocratic states, and are evident in the cases of Sri Lanka (with a major Buddhist–Hindu division), Israel/Palestine (Jewish–Muslim), Serbia (Eastern Orthodox–Catholic), Northern Ireland (Protestant–Catholic), Estonia (Lutheran–Russian Orthodox) and Malaysia (Muslim–Confucies). Yet, our analysis of the ethnocratic model still points to the general subordination of religion vis-à-vis ethno-nationalism. This is the reason our terminology and explanation stress the ethnic and national ‘engines’ of mobilization, through which religion assumes its contemporary political and cultural potency.

Significantly, religious narratives, norms and practices enhance in most ethnocratic societies the project of ethnic spatial expansion. This is mainly due to the sanctification of space, common in areas of ethnic and religious conflict. This process sees religious texts and norms reinterpreted so as to make the exclusive claim to territory a matter of divine truth. This gives rise to a range of religio-spatial practices on all major scales. On the urban level, as well illustrated by [Shilhav \(1991\)](#), and [Kong \(2001\)](#) religious discourses constantly inform the making of ‘sacred urban spaces’. These may include neighborhoods and quarters where enough religious people congregate, so as to elevated their religious customs to the level of public norm. This relates to customs such as dress, eating, gender mixing, content of signs and billboards, the aesthetic, vocal and physical prominence of places of worship.

On regional and national scales too, religious practices, such as the demarcation and celebration of sacred sites, the association of certain areas with religious miracles or major mythical events, movements or wars, are coupled with ethnic claims for that region or state as a homeland. These tend to effectively fuel the struggle for exclusive territorial control. As shown by [Stump \(2000\)](#) and [Akenson \(1992\)](#), religious narratives and goals in conflict situations are inherently spatial, with constant mobilization to widen influence and control.

Winichakul (1994) and Smith (2002a,b) elaborate further on the impact of religion on the national scale, by noting that the ‘layered’ and ‘selective’ historical interpretations of many modern nations is commonly based on popular religious myths, which emphasize ‘our’ control over the land. Such selective collective memories are then extrapolated into present day political territorial claims. Hence, the present (often tacit) coalescence of religious leaders and discourses with the national framework creates a process of *sanctification* of the entire state territory, which becomes a complete and holy ‘geobody’, embodying, symbolizing and mobilizing the nation.

Hence, despite the putatively secular foundation of nationalism (Anderson, 1991), the histories, identities and boundaries of the dominant groups in ethnocratic societies are never very far from their religious affiliation. The religious logic is instrumental for most ethnocratic regimes by generating an essentializing discourse of rigid political and social boundaries. The existence of such boundaries is commonly justified in public opinion, in politics and the media as stemming from divine or ancient roots, and is thus portrayed as ascriptive and insurmountable (Smith, 1995).

The reinforcement of boundaries by nationalism and religion thus assists the dominant and expanding ethnic nation to *segregate and marginalize* peripheral minorities. Moreover, since ethno-nationalism is enmeshed in the definition of the state, and since it often has clear religious undertones, the entry of marginalized minorities to a ‘common good’ defined by the state is extremely difficult. The regime can also use religion to create formal and informal differentiation between citizens, where ‘objective’ or ‘god-given’ religious criteria function as a basis for discriminatory policies; in the allocation of resources, power and prestige (Akenson, 1992).

But—significantly—the close association between ethnocratic regimes and religious institutions is never totally congruent, because at a structural level, religion and nationalism advance competing hegemonic projects. The first is structurally bound to the state, and regards its development and power as a goal in itself. The latter (religious institutions), however, promotes a competing regime of truth and power, which holds a global or international ‘redemptive’ vision, often ‘in waiting’ for the right historical circumstances. For religious movements, particularly of the fundamentalist kind, control of state territory is never an end-state goal, but rather a stepping stone towards a grander vision of broader salvation and control, which may make the nation-state redundant (see Lustick, 2002; Stump, 2000).

Hence, religions such as Islam, Judaism, Buddhism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity—found in most ethnocratic societies—also commonly hold uneasy relations with their state governments. As shown below, in cases such as Sri Lanka and Israel, the bands holding together the Statist and religious projects has been under increasing strain, with religious forces, buoyed by the past support of the ethnic state, now threaten to undermine their territorial, social and political stability.

Ethno-classes

The power of religion and ethnic struggle tend to overshadow class politics in ethnocratic societies, although socioeconomic considerations are still central in the shaping of political struggle over resources. Typically, such considerations are expressed indirectly by the politics of religion and ethnicity, with a general association between poverty, religion and nationalism. But as noted above, ‘the ethnic logic of capital’ operates constantly in ethnocratic societies, and puts in train mechanisms, which generally result in persisting ethnic stratification. These mechanisms include the ‘cultural division of labor’ (Hechter, 2000), the flow of international and domestic capital, which tends to favor the more educated groups, the uneven pattern of urban and industrial development, the typically skewed distribution of governmental assistance and incentives, and the tendency of capital to avoid risks. All these combine to create a socioeconomic map, which tends to separate ethnic groups, thereby fueling inter-ethnic tensions.

Consequently, we observe that politics in ethnocratic states operates on two main and distinguishable levels: *ethno-nations* and *ethno-classes* (for a fuller discussion, see Yiftachel, 1998). This begins with an ethnic logic of politics, which is generated by the national struggle, where ‘our’ ethnic nation is routinely elevated, while rival groups are demoted (Connor, 1994). This logic is often diffused into both majority and minority communities, bestowing legitimacy for the use of hierarchical ethnicity as a political and distributive category, and causing various forms of ethno-class divisions. Hence, ethnocratic regimes do not only promote the dominance of a specific ethnicity, but also the general dominance of ethnicity as a political and socioeconomic category.

The two levels of ethnicity operate with different social effects. Typically, the ethno-national discourse attempts to *unite* the various groups in the nation (as defined by the dominant group, barring ‘external’ of ‘foreign’ minorities); while the ethno-class logic tends to *fragment* groups within the nations according to their socioeconomic status and/or regional locations (see Hechter, 2000). Needless to say, there is never a clear-cut division between ethno-national and ethno-class stratifications, but the analytical distinction helps us trace the central role of ethnicity in both national and economic lines of demarcation, and account for its various manifestations in the ‘thick’ political struggles prevalent in ethnocratic societies.

Consequently, the contours of political mobilization and organization within each ethnic nation often combines ethnic, religious and class affiliation. The patterns of ethno-class stratification typical to ethnocracies has been explained and elaborated elsewhere (see Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, 1995). Its importance for the present discussion is the inherent tension it exposes between the parallel projects of nation- and state building, and the attention it draws to the material aspects of ethnic struggle, frequently overlooked in recent scholarship on politics memory and identities.

The tension between the use of ethnic and civil categories is highly evident during the process of nation-building, which usually entails an active exclusion of groups who are constructed as ‘external’ by the prevailing discourse of the dominant

nation, a status reified by a combination of legal measures, public policies and cultural norms. The excluded are usually indigenous peoples or peripheral minorities, but also collectivities marked as ‘enemies’ or ‘foreigners’. Yet, at the same time, these groups are incorporated (often coercively) into the project of state building. The crises emanating from the process of ‘incorporation without legitimation’ (Mann, 1999; Soysal, 2000) is at the heart of the chronic instability experienced by ethnocratic regimes, to be discussed further below.

The making of ethnocratic regimes: three illustrations

The following section will briefly illustrate the process of ethnicization in three representative states—Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel. The common political-geographical elements emerging from these three examples will then assist to create a more robust and refined model of the ethnocratic regimes, to which the following sections are devoted.

As in all comparative analyses, there are obvious differences between the three states, in history, economy, culture and geography. However, the main commonality, which makes these cases comparable, is the institutionalization of an ethnocratic project ‘within’ a self-declared democratic setting. Hence, several important democratic characteristics, such as separation of powers and elections, exist alongside a state project of deepening ethnic control. This combination sets ‘open’ ethnocratic states, including the three following cases, apart from most other nation-states.

This point requires some elaboration. It is often claimed that most nation-states advance a project of ethnic domination (see Brubaker, 1996), thereby diminishing the distinctiveness of the ethnocratic type (see Smooha, 2002a,b). However, we claim that there exists a qualitative difference between what Brubaker terms ‘nationalizing states’, and between ethnocratic regimes. This difference lies in the deliberate *undermining of the political demos*. As elaborated below, ethnocratic regimes work ceaselessly to prevent the making of an inclusive demos—a community of equal citizens within a definable territory. Instead—they use a rhetoric of the nation-state, but do not allow minorities any feasible path of inclusion. Indeed, the ethnocratic project is often constructed specifically *against* these minorities. There is no attempt to assimilate ‘external’ communities of citizens, quite the contrary—their identity is well demarcated and structurally marginalized.

Put differently, contrary to most nation-states, ethnocratic regimes actually work against the project of universal citizenship. The universal project is of course incomplete in most nation-state, and often involves oppressive policies and practices, such as forced assimilation, discrimination or state-led economic stratification, the state framework, de-jure, still leaves members of minority communities an option of integration.

Ethnocracies, on the other hand, annul this inclusionary option. The state is constructed so as *to prevent* the integration of minorities, typically through the rejection of citizenship, limiting personal laws, restriction on immigration and land rights or

denial of accessibility to decision-making powers. This is a significant structural difference, which sets ethnocratic regimes apart from most ‘normal’ nation-states. Hence, one may point to the zone on a continuum between actively exclusionary and inclusionary regimes, as the ‘tipping zone’ between democracy with an ethnic bias, to ethnocracy. It is analytically difficult to sharply define this zone which may concurrently contain contradictory movements towards democracy and ethnocracy, as evident by the Israeli case below. However, when the political demos has been fundamentally undermined by the state’s ethnocratic laws, policies and institutions, the regime can be said to have crossed the ethnocratic threshold, as evident in Sri Lanka. Estonia, on the other hand, appears to be moving across the tipping zone in the other direction, from ethnocracy to democracy. The three brief cases outlined in the following pages were selected to demonstrate the above processes.

The three cases were also chosen because of the different potential *trajectories* of the ethnocratic project they display—from deterioration into an open ethnic war, to the possibility of peaceful democratization. In Sri Lanka, deepening oppression and intensifying minority resistance have led to a virtual collapse of state into a protracted civil war. In Estonia, the opposite process of non-violent democratization and gradual inclusion of the Russian minority has been gathering pace; while Israel is caught between the conflicting logics of ethnicization and democratization. Its relative openness and high standard of living, as well as the weakness of the Palestinian-Arab minority, have so far halted the eruption of open ethnic conflict, but it is positioned at a historical juncture of delicate fragility.

The different trajectories of political development are highlighted by the political and cultural freedom index data, compiled by the Freedom House project (www.freedomhouse.org). Estonia scores low on political and cultural freedoms during the early 1990s (3 on both assessment, on a scale of 1–7, with 1 being most free). But it significantly improves in the last few years, scoring 1 and 2, respectively in 2003. On the other hand, Sri Lanka scored relatively well during the 1970s with 2 on political freedom and 3 on cultural. The situation deteriorates during the 1990s, when Sri Lanka scores a very low pair of 4 and 5, only to improve slightly during 2003, scores of 2 and 3. Israel remains relatively stable since the 1970s, scoring around 2 on each count for the entire three decades. These three cases then illustrate a wide spectrum of development possibilities apparent under ethnocratic regimes.

Finally, it should be emphasized that we see the development of ethnic relations and regime structure as *dialectical*. That is, state actions and majority politics in ethnocratic states are informed and fueled by minority activity and mobilization. While the dialectics are commonly asymmetrical (with the state having far more power than marginalized minorities), the evolution of these regime cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of minority mobilization, especially as regards the use of violence and terror, and the articulation of dissenting, often threatening, collective narratives.

Sri Lanka: from biethnic democracy to Sinhalese ethnocracy

451

The island state of Sri Lanka (previously Ceylon) is composed of two main ethno-national groups. Sinhalese, who are mainly Buddhist, make up 75% of the state's 19 million inhabitants. Tamils, who are mainly Hindu, make up 18%. Sri Lanka gained its independence from Britain in 1948, after an anti-colonial struggle dominated by the Sinhalese groups, but shared by Tamils, as well as other small ethnic groups on the island. However, in the decade following independence, the state gradually turned towards a *Sinhalization* strategy. This orientation intensified due to Tamil resistance and an ensuing process of ethnic polarization.

452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459

Sri Lanka was formed as a democratic state, with formal institutions and governing procedures following, initially, the Westminster model (Little, 1994). But in later years, the Sri Lankan state was gradually appropriated by the Sinhalese community, mainly due to its demographic advantage and strong sense of ethno-nationalism (de Silva, 1996; Uyangoda, 1994). The Sinhalese used their dominance in the legislative, judiciary and executive arms of government to advance an explicit Sinhalization process. As declared in 1983 by the Sri Lankan development minister (Nissan, 1996: p. 176):

460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467

Sri Lanka is inherently and rightfully a Sinhalese state... this must be accepted as a fact and not a matter of opinion to be debated. By attempting to challenge this premise, Tamils have brought the wrath of the Sinhalese on their own heads; they have themselves to blame.

468
469
470
471

This approach found expression in several key policies and programs, beginning in the 1950s with the adoption of religious Buddhist state symbols, which denote, in the Sri Lankan context, a purely Sinhalese affiliation. Another major step was taken in 1956 when Sinhalese was declared the only official state language. The state's official culture was also developed around a series of Buddhist "invented" histories, symbols and values, glorifying the link between Buddha and the Sinhalese 'guardians' of 'his' island (Little, 1994), and glorifying the images of the Sinhala nation as the indigenous 'sons of the earth', and hence the only rightful owners and controllers of the state (Uyangoda, 1994).

472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480

A further aspect of the Sinhalization strategy was evident in Sri Lanka's *citizenship* policies. Over a million long-term Tamil residents who migrated to the island during the period of British rule, mainly as plantation workers, have been denied citizenship as part of the Sinhalization approach, by being officially classified as 'Indian Tamils'. This forced large sections of this community to leave the island and settle in India during the 1950s and 1960s. Many from this group who remained on the island have remained to date. The Sinhalese majority has thus managed to contain the size of the Tamil community, and reinforce geographical and political intra-Tamil cleavage between 'Indian' and 'Sri Lankan' Tamils. Geographically, Indian Tamils mainly reside in the central heights, while Sri Lankan Tamils inhabit the island's northern and eastern regions. Politically, the disenfranchised Indian Tamils became totally dependent on the Sinhalese regime for basic rights and services, and hence remained politically immobilized.

481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493

Consequently, Indian Tamils have rarely participated or assisted in the militant resistance staged by Sri Lankan Tamils against the Sinhalaizing state.

The island's ethnic geography has also been the main cause of another notable ethnocratic policy—the Sinhalaization of contested space. The British rulers had already encouraged the Tamils to immigrate into Sinhalese areas, breaking a centuries-long tradition of (mainly voluntary) spatial separation. Likewise, the Sri Lankan government encouraged Sinhalese to settle in the island's central and eastern regions, which previously were dominated and claimed by Tamils as part of their 'own' regions.

This has been most evident in the large-scale Mahaweli irrigation and settlement project carried out predominantly during the 1970s and 1980s (Roded, 1999). The project opened up large tracts of agricultural land in the island's central and north-eastern regions, which were offered mostly to landless or impoverished farmers. By 1993, 1.1 million people (the vast majority Sinhalese) were resettled in these regions, creating a new Sinhalese regional lower-class collectivity and exacerbating the conflict with the Tamils, who considered the region as part of their historical 'Elam' homeland (Peiris, 1996).

Subsequently, the regions in question became a destination for large-scale (and mainly unauthorized) Tamil counter-settlement. As the two populations increasingly intermingled in competitive settings (largely as a result of settlement initiatives like the Mahaweli project), antagonism and discrimination against the minority deepened, intensifying the breakdown of social and political order since the early 1980s.

The civil (ethnic) war, which has dominated the Sri Lankan state since the early 1980s, has brought to the fore *the military* as a major agent in the Sinhalaization of contested space, and the reinforcement of Sinhalese dominance in Sri Lankan politics. The army gradually extended state (that is, Sinhalese) control north and eastwards, confining the resisting Tamil groups to the Jaffna Peninsula, at the state's northeastern end. It has also caused a major internal refugee problem, with some 550,000 residents losing their homes during the fighting, 78% of them Tamils (de Silva, 1996). During the same time, a series of emergency and 'security' legislation reduced the protection of Tamil citizens against arbitrary state oppression (Uyangoda, 1994). A parallel constitutional move increased the powers of a popularly elected president at the expense of the previously powerful legislature. Finally, in 1978, several Tamil parliamentarians were disqualified on the basis of 'acting against the Sinhalese state', reducing the already limited Tamil political power (Little, 1994).

The accumulating alienation of Tamils from the Sri Lankan state drove many of them to boycott the political process altogether. From 1978 until 2001, the majority of Tamils boycotted the Sri Lankan elections and only rarely participated in other state affairs. The state, on its part, did little to induce the Tamils back into the political arena until 1987, when further constitutional reforms attempted to ease ethnic tensions by decentralizing state authority and granting autonomy to regional authorities. However, the Tamils did not accept the plan that was prepared without their participation, claiming that: (a) it compromised their drive for

self-determination, and (b) it legitimized the ‘unlawful’ Sinhalese domination of the eastern regions (Nissan, 1996). Further, the state maintained ultimate control by classifying ‘national projects’ that could bypass the proposed decentralized forms of decision-making (Gunasekara, 1996).

The Sinhalization strategy generated widespread Tamil resistance. The Tamils initially struggled for territorial-political autonomy within the Sri Lankan state, but following the state’s ethnocentric policies, began a campaign to reinstate their vision of Tamil Elam—an independent Tamil state. Tamil disengagement from the state further polarized the two groups, culminating in increasing inter-communal mistrust, Tamil withdrawal from state politics and eventually the breakout of a civil war. The fighting, which had been fluctuating since 1982, reached a peak of widespread inter-ethnic violence during the mid-1990s, and exacted a toll of 70–80,000 casualties, most of them civilians.

Only in 2002 was a ceasefire declared, when the Tamil leadership agreed to return to negotiations after the Sinhalese promised serious constitutional amendments and made a more genuine attempt to include the Tamils in devising a new, highly devolved state structure. However, during late 2003 and early 2004, following serious negotiations between the government and the LTTE for substantial Tamil autonomy, Sri Lanka was thrown into a deep political crisis. The ensuing elections of April 2004 returned to power the United People’s Freedom Alliance, traditionally opposed to a federated Sri Lankan state. At the same time, a major split occurred in the LTTE. These developments appear to usher another period of political instability and ethnic conflict.

The case of Sri Lanka illustrates well the emergence of ethnocracy and the inherent tensions between formal democratic procedures and a parallel state project of ethnicizing contested spaces and political institutions. It also demonstrates the inability of an ethnocracy to be sustained for the long term, and its need to structurally reform in order to survive as a state.

Estonia: from communism to (democratizing?) ethnocracy

The independent Estonian state re-emerged during the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1989–1992 period. It is situated on the Baltic Coast, and has a population of 1.5 million, of whom 65% are ethnic Estonians, 14% Russians with citizenship and 25% non-citizen residents (mainly Russian speaking) (EHDR, 2000).

The new polity was formed as a result of an anti-Soviet (and by implication anti-Russian) struggle, which followed five decades of often-brutal Soviet rule. It has since adopted an explicit program of *Estonization* (de-Russification), designed to reinstate the ethnic and national situation existing during a previous period of independence 1918–1939). During that period, ethnic Estonians dominated the state—politically, demographically, economically and culturally. The Soviet Union subsequently promoted a process of Russification and encouraged Russian immigration to Estonia, thereby threatening Estonian demographic and cultural dominance in their homeland.

Since official independence was declared in 1992, state building has assumed ethno-581
cratic characteristics. For example, in 1992, the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) 582
decided not to grant citizenship to ‘non-ethnic’ Estonians. It classified them as 583
‘aliens’, thus excluding them from the 1992 referendum on a new constitution. 584
Estonian state policies in the 1989–2000 period clearly aimed to ensure the polit- 585
ical, territorial and cultural dominance of ethnic Estonians by focusing on 586
citizenship, culture, language and land. 587

In 1992, Estonia adopted the new Constitution, according to which the bearers 588
of the supreme power are ‘the people’ (that is, the citizens; art. 1). The consti- 589
tutional preamble contains a clause obliging the state to ensure the preservation 590
of the (ethnic) Estonian nation and culture. Courts have actively referred to this 591
preamble in a variety of rulings on citizenship and property matters. 592

Hence, the new Constitution includes special clauses concerning the priority of 593
ethnic Estonians, Estonian culture and language (Ruutsoo, 1998: p. 176). Every 594
Estonian is entitled to preserve his/her national identity, but no special minority 595
rights are recognized by the Constitution. Some state symbols are of purely ethnic 596
character (e.g. flag, anthem, stamps and official letterheads). The state holidays 597
include Protestant sacred days, not Russian Orthodox. There is no State Church in 598
Estonia, but the majority of ethnic Estonians are (Protestant) Lutheran, and Est- 599
onian nationalism is widely associated with a Lutheran way of life, as an antithesis 600
to the Orthodox Russian influence. During the Communist years, the population 601
became largely secular, but since the return of Estonian nationalism as a legitimate 602
ideology, the church has increased markedly its public profile (www.estonica.org). 603

The issue of citizenship (and by association culture and language) has been most 604
central to the Estonization project. The Citizenship Law of 1992 (amended 1995) 605
granted citizenship to all pre-1940 citizens and their descendants and prohibited 606
dual citizenship. Because in 1940, the state was 92% ethnic Estonians, this law 607
actually granted superior citizenship rights to ethnic Estonians (in and outside the 608
state) over the state’s own Russian residents. 609

The law sets a difficult path for acquisition of citizenship by non-Estonians, 610
including long-term state residents who previously had full (Soviet) citizenship 611
rights and are now considered ‘aliens’. Such ‘aliens’ are required to reside in Est- 612
onia for at least five years, pass demanding language tests, prove command of the 613
Estonian constitution, have a steady income, establish permanent residency and 614
pledge allegiance to the state and its (ethnic) character (The Aliens Law, 1989; 615
2000; Human Rights Watch, 2000). 616

The ethnicization strategy is also evident in Estonia’s *language* policies, which 617
have reinforced the imposed dominance of the Estonian language in most spheres 618
of life, including education, street signs and government services. This dominance 619
was deepened by a new language law, introduced in 1989 (and amended in 1995, 620
1999 and 2000), which demoted Russian to the status of a ‘foreign’ language, 621
similar to dozens of other languages used by immigrants and minorities. The 622
requirements of the new law severely restricts the public usage of any language 623
except Estonian. For example, ‘foreign’ languages are prohibited in all street and 624
commercial signs, and all TV broadcasts must have Estonian subtitles. Estonian is 625

the compulsory language in the parliament and local councils, for state employees and for government dealings in both public and private sectors. The only exception is minority language usage in territories where they form a majority, but this is implemented in a very restrictive manner.

In 1993, the Riigikogu enacted a new law for *Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities* (Estonian Government, RT 1993, 71,1000). But the law defined a minority as consisting of citizens only. Thus, the state did not recognize special rights of the vast majority of the non-Estonian population. Previously, the Soviet Law on National Rights allowed minorities full enjoyment of certain rights obtainable through special autonomous organs and under the supervision of the State.

Ethnicization has also been prominent on the political level. After 1992, right-wing nationalist parties have dominated the Riigikogu. A process of ethnic political *polarization* has seen electoral competition revolving around the intensity of the Estonization (and de-Russification) process. Changes of government during the 1990s did not result in any significant change in Estonia's policies toward its Russian minority. Russians have suffered persistent political under-representation: in the 1992 Parliament, there were no ethnic Russians, while in 1995 and in 1999, their numbers rose to only six members (out of 100). In the Riigikogu, Russians have always belonged to the opposition and have had no significant influence on the decision-making process.

Ethnic Estonian dominance is also expressed in denial of state recognition of the local Orthodox Church under its pre-war name (Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church; see Theile, 1999). That means the deprivation of the church pre-war property in the process of property restitution, as noted below. In 1993, the Government registered the EAOC an 'exile' entity whose legitimacy is highly disputable.

As expected, and as planned by Estonian policymakers, the laws created considerable difficulties for non-ethnic Estonians to acquire citizenship, and have caused substantial emigration, mainly into Russia, with some 133,000 Russians leaving Estonia during the 1990s (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2000). By 1999, only about 38% of this group received Estonian citizenship, while 19% have retained foreign (mainly Russian) citizenship, and 43% have remained stateless. Non-citizens are excluded from many political and economic arenas in Estonian life, and are prohibited from voting or being elected at a national level. The Russians have voting rights for local elections, but cannot stand for mayorship (EHDR, 1999; Hallik, 1998).

The discrepancy between citizenry and the residential composition of Estonian is highlighted by the following figures: in 1999, ethnic Estonians constituted 81% of the citizenry, but only 65% of the population. Likewise, Russians were 28% of the residents, but only 14% of the citizenry. However, due to pressure from the European Union, into which Estonia seeks to integrate, and from international human rights organizations, Estonia introduced in the beginning of the 2000s several measures which open a path of naturalization for the Russians, evolving mainly around language acquisition, military service or contribution to the Estonian public (Berg, 2002; Pettai & Hallik, 2002).

The Estonian government also attempted to reinforce ethnic land control, by resurrecting the traditional 'indigenous' Estonian system of family farms to replace

the Kolchoz and Sobchov Soviet system of collective cultivation. This was aided by the Law for Land Reform (1992), the Law of Agrarian Reform (1994) and a complex system of financial incentives designed to assist the restitution and privatization of land, while at the same time restrict the benefits of this process chiefly to ethnic Estonians (Anderson, 1999).

In sum, like Sri Lanka, but within different historical and geographical settings, Estonia demonstrates the deep logic of ethnicization behind ethnocratic structure and policies. Estonia adopted a structure of an ‘open’ formal democracy, but at another level has set into motion an ethnic transformation of the state from a Russified communist republic into an ethnic Estonian state. The new state structurally discriminates against most of its long-term Russian residents, and actively facilitates the Estonization of institutions, politics, culture and territory. However, unlike Sri Lanka, the ethnicization process has not been violent, and appears to be waning, mainly due to the influence of the European Union and the globalization of ethnic politics (Berg, 2002). Hence, Estonia appears to be an ethnocracy undergoing a gradual process of democratization.

Israel: an ethnocratic settler-state

Following half a century of Jewish colonization of (mainly Arab) Palestine, tacitly supported by the British rulers, Israel gained its independence in 1948. This followed a failed UN partition attempt, rejected by the Arabs, and a Palestinian–Jewish war, in which some 700,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out of their homeland. Israel seized control over 78% of Mandatory Palestine, about 40% larger than the territory allocated to it by the UN plan. This area—known as ‘Israel Proper’ (the sovereign state within its pre-1967 borders)—is the focus of our analysis here, not including the occupied Palestinian territories. We do acknowledge, of course, that the occupation and on-going Jewish settlement in Palestinian territories have had an immense impact on ethnic relations, but for comparative and methodological reasons, ‘Israel Proper’—where Israeli sovereignty is internationally recognized—is a more appropriate scale of analysis. This, without diminishing the significance of the increasingly oppressive regime imposed by Israel in the Palestinian occupied territories for nearly four decades, and the waves of mutual violence it generated.

In 1949, only 160,000 Palestinian-Arabs remained in Israel, and received state citizenship. In the next five decades, Israel absorbed some 2.7 million Jewish refugees and immigrants, and prevented the return of the Palestinian refugees, who remained chiefly in surrounding Middle-Eastern states. In the year 2002, Palestinian-Arabs have become 18% of Israel’s population of 6.3 million.

Both ethno-national groups claim to have historical rights over the country. The Palestinian-Arabs claim continuous residence as indigenous people, and a natural right for self-determination in a national homeland. The Jewish-Zionist justification rests on the existence of ancient Israelite kingdoms on the land before the Jews were forcefully exiled, and on sacred Jewish texts, which promise the land to the Israelite ‘chosen people’. The Zionist movement claims that Jews maintained

in their diasporas a continuous bond with the ‘promised land’, and that following the eruption of genocidal European anti-Semitism, the Land of Israel (Palestine) became the rightful and natural site in which to build a safe, independent, Jewish state (Kimmerling, 2001).

On a formal level, Israel formed a democratic regime in 1948, but in parallel initiated a concerted project of *Judaizing* the land and the polity. Israel’s Declaration of Independence, for example, stresses the Jewish connection to an ancient homeland, and its expression as political control over this contested land:

In the Land of Yisrael the Jewish people was created. Here its spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped... the people kept faith with it throughout their dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return... According to our natural and historical right... we are hereby declaring the establishment of a Jewish state in this Land of Israel...

The Judaization project, which turned Israel into a ‘frontier state’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002) was significantly aided by Jewish diaspora, which not only funded many Israeli projects, but also circumvented the state apparatus by forming and maintaining Jewish organizations, which operate in Israel officially as ethnic arms of the states. These organizations—notably the Jewish National Fund and/or the Jewish Agency—enabled the implementation of ethnocentric ‘Jews only’ policies in the allocation of key resources, powers and land, thereby structurally undermining the notion of equal citizenship (Rouhana, 1997; Kretzmer, 2002).

Until 1966, Israel’s Arab citizens were placed under military rule. In the following decades, and against the on-going conflict with their Palestinian brethren, Israel’s enacted a series of laws, which enshrine the legal, institutional and political dominance of Jewish goals and interests. Despite small advances in the last decade, discrimination against Israel’s Arab citizens has remained rampant, leading a recent comprehensive study as to label the minority as ‘citizens without citizenship’ (MADA, 2003).

Judaization took many substantive forms, including the mass expropriation of Arab land in Israel (Kedar, 1998), the building of over 700 Jewish settlements, often on the sites of the hundreds of Arab villages destroyed after the 1948 war (see Falah, 1996, 2003), the Hebraization of the landscape and erasure of its Palestinian Arab past (Benvenisti, 2001), and the establishment of a highly centralized economy and political systems in which the Arab minority was marginalized and weakened. Expansion of Jewish control continued after the 1967 war, with the conquest and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, but also in Israel’s own outlying regions, mainly the northern Galilee and southern Negev, where hundreds of thousands of Jews were settled in close proximity to Arab towns and villages. This was facilitated by the Israeli land and planning systems which have worked consistently for the transfer of spatial control from Arab to Jewish hands, and have legitimized, planned and funded large-scale projects of Jewish settlement (see Benvenisti, 2001; Yiftachel & Kedar, 2000; Yacobi and Yiftachel, 2003).

Notably, then, despite the formal appearance of the Israeli regime as democratic, the state has advanced an ethnocratic strategy in key bases of the regime. For example, immigration policies, governed by the Jewish Law of Return, allow any Jew and his/her immediate family to enter Israel and receive citizenship. At the same time, the immigration and naturalization of non-Jews, those born on the land or married to an Arab Israeli has been made extremely difficult (Kretzmer, 1990).

Other building blocks of Israel's Judaization strategy are manifest in the state's development policies, which have consistently privileged Jewish capital and localities over their Arab counterparts. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), too, is in essence a Jewish army, and military service is a prerequisite for substantial benefits in employment, education, land allocation, and access to the state's centers of power. Jewish-Israeli Hebrew culture is the dominant force in shaping Israel's public spaces. While Arabic is an official state language, it is virtually impossible to deal with the Israeli bureaucracy, legal system, arms of government or national media in Arabic (Ghanem, 1998; Rouhana, 1997).

The state culture also reflects a deep connection with the Jewish religion: Jewish holidays and the Sabbath are Israel's main rest days, no public transport or free commerce is available on these holidays, and all public (and most private) food outlets observe Jewish dietary laws. Personal matters are run according to religious laws, giving the Arab citizen a measure of religious autonomy. Arabic is also an official language, used in the separate Arab education stream. But despite these measures, Jews control decision-making in most educational and religious arenas, meaning that communal autonomy is severely restricted. The above measures are hence often interpreted as preserving institutional communal segregation between Jews and Arabs (Shafir & Peled, 2002).

In addition, while Israel lacks a formal constitution, the state's legal system has reinforced its Jewish character, with legislation privileging Jewish interests and goals. According to a recent study, 18 laws explicitly discriminate against Israel's Palestinian-Arab citizens, rupturing the notion of the 'demos' as a political community of equals. This despite concerted legal activity, especially through appeals to the Israeli High Court, which have managed to outlaw or contain several legal obstacles to Arab civil equality (Adala, 1998, 2003). It is worth noting that even the 1992 new and putatively liberal basic Laws—hailed as signaling a 'civil revolution' (Barak, 1998)—still ambiguously declare the state's character as Jewish and democratic.

Israeli-Jewish culture fostered an exclusive Jewish bond to the land, and for many years denied, delegitimized and ignored the existence of Palestinian nationalism, and hence the minority's collective territorial or political rights. Following the 1993 Oslo agreement and the mutual recognition of Jewish and Palestinian 'national rights', the rhetoric has somewhat changed, although Jewish settlement and expansion of land control has continued in parallel to contraction in several heavily populated Palestinian areas.

Like in Sri Lanka, oppression has met with increasing minority resistance. This has been expressed by continuing waves of large-scale protest against state policies, which reached a notable height in October 2000, when 12 Arab citizens were killed by state forces during mass demonstrations in support of the Palestinian al-Aqsa

Intifada. Political polarization has also deepened between the two ethnic groups, with increasing votes going to non-Zionist Arab parties, reaching 70% in 1999, and an all time high of 81% in the 2003 elections. In the special Prime Ministerial elections of 2001, and following the killing of 12 Arab demonstrators, 82% of Arab citizens boycotted the vote, signaling again the intensifying process of polarization.³

As we can see, although Israel managed to project a democratic image, mainly because of a competitive electoral system and relatively independent judiciary and media, in effect it became a state dedicated to the expansion and control of one ethnic group, at the expense of a homeland minority community, and with significant undermining of basic democratic principles (see Ghanem, et al., 1998).⁴ To date, the Judaization strategy had remained a main foundation of the Israeli ethnocratic regime.

Ethnocracy and regime components

The foregoing accounts of Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia highlighted the changing ethnic relations in states undergoing a planned process of ‘ethnicization’. The three illustrative cases facilitate the next step of our exploration: a discussion of the relationships between ethnocracy and key regime components—namely, democracy, minority status and political stability.

*Ethnocracy and democracy*⁵

The ‘open’ ethnocratic regimes studied here combine partial elements of both authoritarian and democratic systems. But regardless of the formal political system, they enhance a rule by, and for, a specific ethnos. As such, they cannot be classified as democracies in a substantive sense, as they structurally privilege one group of citizens over all others, and strive to maintain that privilege.

Ethnocracies are, therefore, neither democratic, nor authoritarian (or ‘Herrenvolk’) systems of government. The lack of democracy, as noted above, rests on *the rupture of the concept of the ‘demos’*, on their unequal citizenship, and on their laws and policies that enable the seizure of the state by one ethno-national group. They are not authoritarian, as they extend significant (though partial) political rights to ethnic minorities.

³ While most Arabs (62%) returned to vote in the 2003 elections, the Arab turnout was the lowest among all ethnic groups in the country and the second lowest in history after 2001.

⁴ It should be noted, however, that Israel’s electoral system has not been universal since the 1970s, given the voting rights granted to Jewish settlers (who reside outside the state’s sovereign area), and the denial of such rights from all Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The settlers have determined the outcome of several key elections and are over-represented in Israel’s government apparatus. This clearly breaks the concept of universal suffrage, which calls for an overlap of territory, citizenship and voting power, and has further marginalized the Arab citizens politically. In addition, Israel’s electoral laws prohibit any party opposed to Zionism from contesting the elections, placing another serious breach of the concept of universal and free elections.

⁵ The following two sections are summarized from Yiftachel (2000).

Importantly, we do not treat the term ‘democracy’ uncritically, recognizing that it is a contested concept, widely abused, particularly in multi-ethnic states (see Mann, 1999). This is not the place to delve deeply into democratic theory. Suffice is to note that several key principles have emerged as foundations for achieving the main tenets of democracy—*equality and liberty*. These principles include equal citizenship, protection of individuals and minorities against the tyranny of states, majorities or churches, and a range of civil, political and economic rights (Held, 1990). A stable constitution, periodic and universal elections and free media generally ensure the attainment of these rights (Dahl, 1995). In multi-ethnic or multinational polities, as illustrated by the seminal works of Lijphart (1977), Kymlicka (1995) and Rawls (1999), a certain parity, recognition and proportionality between the ethnic collectivities is a pre-requisite for democratic legitimacy and stability. While no state ever implements these principles fully, ethnocratic regimes are conspicuous in breaching the spirit, purpose and major tenets of the democracy ideal.

Generally, ethnocratic regimes emphasize the procedural aspects of their self-defined democracy, but attempt to draw attention away from substantive matters, such as privileges for the dominant group in the allocation of resources, political representation, territorial control or preference by the law. The emphasis on procedural aspects also diverts attention from the substantive limitations placed on minority rights and capabilities, and from the lack of equal treatment by state policies, laws and institutions.

To further fathom the workings of ‘open’ ethnocracies, and drawing on Gramscian-informed analysis, we differentiate analytically between regime *features* and *structure*. As noted in Fig. 1, ethnocracies demonstrate ‘visible’ democratic features, such as periodic elections, free media and autonomous judiciary that protects, and (some) human rights legislation. But these tend to work on a ‘surface level’, while the deeper structure of such regimes it undermines key democratic principles, such as civil and legal equality within agreed state boundaries, protection of minorities, maintenance of equality and a measure of proportionality between the state’s main ethnic groups.

The analytical differentiation between ‘features’ and ‘structure’ highlights the selective and often hollow use of the term ‘democracy’ by the dominant ethnic group. The democratic discourse, partial as it is, often has the effect of legitimizing the regime, especially in the eyes of the majority, as evident so vividly in Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia.⁶

A hallmark of the ethnocratic hegemony is the common waging of political struggles around the ‘shallower’ state features, while relatively few battles are fought over the ‘deeper’ ethnic (and class) hegemony, which is painted as ‘natural’

⁶ The distinction between ‘features’ and ‘structure’ is, needless to say, never overt or stable, with a constant flow of reciprocal influences. However, during the intense process of state building, the ethnocratic logic of the regime structure generally dictates the terms of much of what transpires in the more visible arenas of political features.

Ethnocratic Regime: Structure and Features A Conceptual Framework




Fig. 1. Ethnocratic regime: structure and features a conceptual framework.

and universal. As powerfully argued by Antonio Gramsci (1971); as synthesized by Sasoon (1987: p. 232), a ‘moment’ of hegemony is marked by:

...the unquestioned dominance of a certain way of life... when a single concept of reality informs society’s tastes, morality, customs, religious and political principles...’ (Sasoon, 1987: p. 232).

Drawing on the cases of Sri Lanka, Israel and Estonia discussed above, we have identified several structural ‘bases’, which constitute the foundation of ethnocratic regimes. These are key components of the dominant hegemony, which are generally protected by the boundaries of public discourse and political discussion. Let us emphasize again that we see the structural bases of the regime as *dynamic*, evolving over time in an effort to maintain their ‘natural’ and popularly accepted status. But as part of the conflict-riddled ethnocratic regime, they are never sustainable in the long term. The main regime bases thus include:

- *Demography*: rights of entry and membership into the political community define the all important boundaries of political (and by implication social) power. In ethnocracies immigration and citizenship are chiefly determined by affiliation with the dominant ethnic-nation. 883–886
- *Land and settlement*: territorial control is central for ethno-national politics. As such, the ownership, use and development of land, as well as planning and settlement policies are shaped by the state's project of extending ethno-national control over its (multi-ethnic) territory. 887–890
- *Armed forces*: violent force is critical in assisting the state to maintain (oppressive) ethno-national control over contested regions and resisting groups. To that end, the armed forces (the military, the police), which bear the name of the entire state, are predominantly affiliated with the leading ethnic nation. 891–894
- *Capital flow*: while the flow of capital and development is deeply influenced by an 'ethnic logic', privileging the dominant ethno-classes; notably, these market mechanisms are often represented as 'free' or 'neutral' and hence beyond challenge. 895–898
- *The Constitutional System*: legalism often depoliticizes and legitimizes patterns of ethnic control. Such controls are often premised on redundant, absurd, non-existent or only partially functional constitutional settings. This is often presented as 'the law of the land', and subsequently placed outside the realm of legitimately contested issues. 899–903
- *Public culture*: the ethnocratic public culture is formulated around a set of symbols, representations, traditions and practices, which tend to reinforce the narratives of the dominant ethno-national group; while silencing, degrading or ridiculing contesting cultures or perspectives. 904–907

Genuine open debates on these 'taken-for-granted' issues are generally absent from the public discourse, especially among the dominant majority. When these issues are questioned by resisting groups (say, in the parliament, or through the media) they are usually silenced, ridiculed or represented as 'state enemies'. But the dominance of regime 'truths' is of course never absolute, and may be exposed and resisted by political entrepreneurs exploiting the tensions between the declared 'democracy' and its substantive discriminatory manifestation. In such settings, destabilizing cracks are likely to appear in the ethnocratic structure. 908–915

Ethnocracy and minorities

Central to the ethnocratic regime is its ability to maintain the dominance of the leading ethno-national group while marginalizing and/or excluding indigenous or national minorities. But not all minorities are treated equally, with some incorporated as 'internal' while others are constructed as 'external'. A critical difference exists between those considered part of the 'historical' or even 'genetic' nation, and others whose presence is portrayed as mere historical coincidence, or as a 'danger' to the security and integrity of the dominant ethnos. These discourses strip 916–923

‘external’ minorities from means of inclusion into the meaningful sites of ‘the nation’ (Penrose, 2000a,b). 924

Ethnocracies are generally driven by a sense of collective entitlement among the majority group to control ‘its’ homeland—that is, the state—as part and parcel of what is conceived as a universal right for self-determination. Thus, belonging to the dominant ethno-nation (and to its leading ethno-classes) is the key to mobility among peripheral groups. This is the strategy adopted by most immigrant minorities, who thereby distance themselves from indigenous or other ‘external’ minorities. As such, ethnocratic societies continuously maintain an ‘ethnic project’, which similarly to the ‘racial project’ identified by Omi and Winant (1994), attempts to build an informal public image of ‘separate and unequal’. 925–934

The leading ethno-classes (also often termed ‘the ‘charter’ or ‘titular’ groups) can thus play a dual game, vis-a-vis peripheral minorities. On the one hand, they articulate a discourse of belonging, which incorporates immigrant and peripheral groups not associated with any ‘external’ or ‘rival’ nation. These groups are ‘invited’ to assimilate into the moral community of the dominant ethno-nation. But on the other hand, the dominant groups use this very discourse of inclusion and belonging to conceal the uneven effects of its strategies, which often marginalize the immigrants economically, culturally and geographically. It would be a mistake, however, to treat this as a conspiracy; it is rather an expression of broad social interest, generally unarticulated, privileging social circles that are closest to the ethno-national core. This ‘natural’ process tends to broadly reproduce—though never replicate—patterns of social stratification. 935–946

In contrast, the strategy towards indigenous and/or national (homeland) minorities is generally more openly oppressive. They are represented and treated, at best, as ‘external’ to the ethno-national project, or, at worst, as a subversive threat. The examples of Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel show that the tenets of self-determination are used only selectively, pertaining to ethnicity and not to an inclusive geographical unit, as required by the basic principles of democratic statehood. Oppressive policies are often ‘wrapped’ in a discourse of modernity, progress and democracy, but the political and material reality is unmistakable, entailing minority dispossession and exclusion. 947–955

However, the self-representation of most ethnocracies as democratic creates structural tensions, because it requires the state to go beyond lip service and empower external minorities with some (though less than equal) formal political powers. The tensions between the claims of democracy and the denial of minority equality create spaces of struggle and “cracks” in the hegemonic order. These often fuel minority resistance and inter-ethnic conflict typical to ethnocratic states (see Mann, 1999). 956–962

Ethnocracy and political instability 963

One of our main theoretical arguments relates to the instability of ethnocratic regimes. We do not have the space to enter here the diverse and rich discussion 964–965

over the definition and measurement of political stability beyond noting that we accept the main parameters offered by the likes of Lane and Ersson (1991) or McGarry and O'Leary (1995). They see political instability as strongly related to *regime illegitimacy* among minorities, which results in a combination of social disorder and breakdown of regime functions. This is often followed by the bypassing of the regime by disgruntled minorities, by increasing forms of political polarization, and by intensifying waves of anti-governmental protest and violence.

In this sense, the ethnocratic model builds on, and critiques, the 'control' model of political stability, first offered by Lustick (1979, 1993) and later used by geographers such as Taylor (1995) and Rumley (1999). Lustick's argument pointed usefully to the ability of regimes to maintain stability through a range of control mechanisms, including the construction of hegemonic discourses and institutions, and the cooptation and fragmentation of oppositional elements. But our observation is that in ethnocratic regimes, such controls are only viable for the short term, leading in the long term to a destabilizing momentum.

The chronic instability of the 'open' ethnocratic regimes stems from a combination of two of their main attributes: (a) the long-term impact of the spatial, political and economic expansion of the dominant majority, and the associated control mechanisms exerted over ethnic and national minorities, and (b) the democratic self-representation of the regime.

The first factor is quite clear: ethnocratic regimes often reflect and exacerbate ethnic tensions and conflicts, because they structurally privilege one ethnic nation, both within the state and among its diasporas over the state's resident minorities. As clearly shown in the cases of Sri Lanka, Estonia and Israel, the dominant group then uses the state apparatus, and the international legitimacy accorded to state sovereignty, to expand its power, resources and prestige, often at the expense of minorities. In this sense, ethnocratic regimes tend to generate constant tensions between minorities and majorities.

However, minority resistance to control and discrimination is necessary, but not sufficient, to destabilize the regime. It is the semi-open nature of ethnocratic regimes, their partial democratization, and the limited rights extended to minorities, which combine to develop, in a complex process, the situation of structural instability. In the short-term, we have often seen that partial democratization, and especially the extension of mere procedural measures (such as 'representation without influence', commonly allowed for minorities in ethnic regimes) may actually prolong the control of the dominant group.

At the same time, the self-representation of the state as democratic, despite its violation of democratic principles on most substantive arenas of state operation, does enable the development of minority consciousness and political mobilization. Such mobilization will typically rally around the contradictions and tensions embedded in the coterminous existence of limited democratic institutions and procedures, and entrenched patterns of ethnic dominance.

It also draws on the growing importance of human and minority rights in the international political discourse, and on the growing institutionalization of democratic norms among the international community. Due to the strengthening links

between international politics and economy, these new arenas can, and do, influence majority–minority relations traditionally perceived as ‘internal’ (Soysal, 2000).

The effectiveness of minority mobilization, however, is generally limited, as it encounters insurmountable cultural, political, economic and geographical obstacles to full integration and/or equality within their states. Within such settings, minorities have several options, which include assimilation (unlikely in ethnocracies), the intensification of their protest to escalating levels of violence, or the establishment of competing frameworks of governance and resource allocation accompanied by disengagement from the state.

The last two courses of action tend to reinforce one another and undermine the political stability of divided states and regions. They have been evident in the cases of Sri Lanka and Israel Palestine, but not in Estonia as yet. The difference may lie in the short time period since the establishment of the ethnocratic Estonian state, and the hope among the Russian minority to improve their situation by political means (Hallik, 1998). This hope has totally been abandoned by Tamils in Sri Lanka (de Silva, 1996), and is quickly fading for Palestinian-Arabs in Israel (see Ghanem, 2000).

The susceptibility of such regimes to the surfacing of open ethnic conflict, and their chronic instability, are powerful engines of political change. Yet, this change may take varying, and at times contrasting, directions. We find a number of ethnocratic states which have responded to the pressures and contradictions of ethnic dominance with a series of democratization steps, such as Canada, Belgium, Spain, Greece, and most recently South Africa and Northern Ireland.

At the same time, other ethnocracies have reacted to the grievances of marginalized minorities by tightening the control over minorities and by deepening the state’s undemocratic ethnic structure. Several other states—such as Israel, Estonia and Slovakia—have oscillated between the two options, attempting to keep afloat both their links with the western democratic world, with the democratization this entails, and concurrently preserve the control of the dominant ethnic group.

The dynamics of ethnocratic regimes should thus be understood as moving along a continuum, between the poles of democratization and ethnicization. Quite often, no clear direction prevails for long periods, and the state policy agenda may be driven by crises rather than design. A thorough discussion of the possible transition of regimes from ethnocracy to democracy remains outside the scope of this paper, but clearly, it is one of the most urgent challenges facing such regimes. As already mentioned, such an analysis is currently being developed by the authors.

A concluding note

The paper presented a framework for understanding ethnocratic regimes. It showed that in certain geographical and historical circumstances, various forces combine to create such regimes, and associated processes of ethnicization and stratification. The paper focused on ‘open’ ethnocracies, where the state represents itself as democratic, while simultaneously facilitating the seizure of a contested territory and power by a dominant ethnic nation. It outlined the characteristics of

such regimes, showed their distinctiveness from the ‘normal’ nation-state model, and analyzed their ability to maintain ethnic dominance. The paper also discussed the relation of ethnocratic regimes with minorities, democracy and political instability, and explored the tensions and contradictions which generate their decline and transformation.

Our framework here is both broad and preliminary. It needs to be tested, challenged and expanded, in order to gain depth, validity and robustness. This undertaking can advance in various directions, the most obvious are: (a) comparative research which would test, calibrate and modify the assertions made above; (b) in-depth case studies, which would study the more detailed and subtle form of ethnocratic expansion and hegemony, as well as the forms of resistance and challenge to the system; (c) theoretical explorations and modifications, especially vis-a-vis new structural forces influencing the nation-state, such as the increasingly globalizing world economy, and/or the growing force and influence of the discourse of human rights and multi-culturalism. Efforts in these directions have begun by the authors, but much further research is needed to enrich our understanding of ethnocratic states, and their volatile ethnic relations.

References

- Adalah. (1998). *Legal violations of Arab rights in Israel*. Shefa'amre, Israel: Adalah.
- Adalah. (2003). *Law and politics in the Or Commission*. Shefa'amre: Adalah.
- Akenson, D. (1992). *God's peoples: covenant and land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. (2nd ed.). London: Verso.
- Anderson, E.-A. (1999). *An ethnic perspective on economic reform: the case of Estonia*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Barak, A. (1998). The role of Supreme Court in a democracy. *Israel Studies*, 3(2), 8–16.
- Benhabib, S. (2002). *The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Benvenisti, M. (2001). *Sacred landscapes*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Berg, E. (2002). Local resistance, national identity and global swings in post-Soviet Estonia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54(1), 109–122.
- Bermeo, N. (1997). Myths of moderation: confrontation and conflict during democratic transitions. *Comparative Politics*, 29(3).
- Boal, F. (1987). Segregation. In M. Pacione (Ed.), *Progress in social geography* (pp. 90–128). London: Croom Helm.
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Collier, D., & Levitski, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research. *World Politics*, 49(April), 430–451.
- Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University press.
- Conversi, D. (Ed.). (2000). *Ethnonationalism in the contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Dahl, R. (1995). *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- de Silva, K. M. (1996). *Managing ethnic tensions in multi ethnic societies: Sri-Lanka 1880–1985*. New York: University Press of America.

- Diamond, L. (2002). Universal democracy? *Policy Review*. On-line version available: <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond.html>. 1100
- EHDR (Estonian Human Development Report) (1999–2000). Electronic reference format. Retrieved 1101
July 24 2001 from world wide web: <http://www.undp.ee/nhdr98/en/2/3/html>. 1102
- Eyles, J. (1990). Group identity and urban space: the North American experience. In M. Chisholm, & 1103
D. Smith (Eds.), *Shared space, divided space: Essays on conflict and territorial organization* (pp. 46– 1105
66). Boston: Unwin Hyman. 1106
- Falah, G. (1996). The 1948 Israeli–Palestinian War and its aftermath: the transformation and de-signifi- 1107
cation of Palestine’s cultural landscape. *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 86(2), 1108
256–285. 1109
- Falah, G. (2003). Dynamic patterns of shrinking Arab lands in Palestine. *Political Geography*, 22, 1110
179–209. 1111
- Ghanem, A. (1998). State and minority in Israel: the case of ethnic state and the predicament of its min- 1112
ority. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(3), 428–447. 1113
- Ghanem, A. (2000). *The Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel, 1948–2000*. Albany: SUNY Press. 1114
- Ghanem, A., Rouhana, N., & Yiftachel, O. (1998). Questioning ethnic democracy. *Israel Studies*, 3(2), 1115
252–267. 1116
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from prison notebook*. New York: International Publishers. 1117
- Gunasekara, S. L. (1996). *Tigers, ‘moderates’ and Pandora’s package*. Colombo: Multipacks (Ceylon) 1118
Limited. 1119
- Gurr, T. (2000). *Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century*. Washington, DC: US Insti- 1120
tute of Peace. 1121
- Hakli, J. (2001). In the territory of knowledge: state-centred discourses and the construction of society. 1122
Progress in Human Geography, 25(3), 403–422. 1123
- Hallik, K. (1998). Non-Estonians: historic and demographic background in Heidmets. In Mati (Ed.), 1124
Russian minority and challenges for Estonia (pp. 13–28). Tallinn: TPÜ (in Estonian). 1125
- Harris, E. (2001). *Nationalism and democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia*. Aldershot: 1126
Ashgate. 1127
- Hechter, M. (2000). *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1128
- Held, D. (1990). The decline of the nation state. In S. Hall, & M. Jacques (Eds.), *New times: the chan- 1129
ging face of politics in the 1990s* (pp. 191–204). London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1130
- Herb, G., & Kaplan, D. (Eds.). (1999), *Nested identities: Nationalism, territory and scale*. Boulder: 1131
Rowman and Littlefield. 1132
- Huntington, S. (1997). After twenty years: the future of the third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 8(4), 1133
3–12. 1134
- Keating, M., & McGarry, J. (Eds.). (2001), *Minority nationalism and the changing international order*. 1135
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1136
- Kedar, S. (1998). Minority time, majority time: land, nation and the law of adverse possession in Israel. 1137
Iyyunei Mishpat, 21(3), 665–746. 1138
- Kimmerling, B. (2001). *The invention and decline of Israeliness: state, society, and the military*. Berkeley: 1139
University of California Press. 1140
- Kong, L. (2001). Mapping ‘new’ geographies of religion: politics and poetics in modernity. *Progress in 1141
Human Geography*, 25(3), 211–233. 1142
- Kretzmer, D. (1990). *The legal status of the Arabs in Israel*. Boulder: Westview Press. 1143
- Kretzmer, D. (2002). *The legal status of the Arabs in Israel*. Jerusalem: Van-Leer Institute (Arabic, 1144
English). 1145
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon 1146
Press. 1147
- Kymlicka, W. (2001). *Politics in the vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship*. Oxford: 1148
Oxford University Press. 1149
- Lane, J. E., & Ersson, S. O. (1991). *Politics and society in Western Europe*. London: Sage. 1150
- Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale Univer- 1151
sity Press. 1152

- Linz, J., & Stephan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 1153–1154
- Little, D. (1994). *Sri Lanka: the invention of enmity*. Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace. 1155
- Lustick, I. (1979). Stability in deeply divided societies: consociationalization vs control. *World Politics*, 31, 325–344. 1156–1157
- Lustick, I. (1993). *Unsettled states, disputed lands*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1158
- Lustick, I. (2002). Nationalism and religion in the middle east. *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 2(3), 171–202. 1159–1160
- MADA (Arab Center for Studies of Applied Research), & Sultani, N. (2003). *Citizens without citizenship*. Haifa: MADA. 1161–1162
- Mann, M. (1999). The dark side of democracy: the modern tradition of ethnic and political cleansing. *New Left Review*, 253(June), 18–45. 1163–1164
- Mann, M. (2000). Democracy and ethnic war. *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 1(2), 115–134. 1165
- McGarry, J. (1998). Demographic engineering: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(4), 613–638. 1166–1167
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (1995). *Explaining Northern Ireland: broken images*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 1168–1169
- McGarry, J., & O'Leary, B. (Eds.). (1993). *The politics of ethnic conflict regulation*. London: Routledge. 1170
- Murphy, A. (2002). The territorial underpinnings of national identity. *Geopolitics*, 7(2), 193–214. 1171
- Nissan, E. (1996). *Sri Lanka: a bitter harvest*. London: Minority Rights Group. 1172
- Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). *Racial formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1990s*. New York: Routledge. 1173–1174
- Paasi, A. (1999). The social construction of territorial identities. *Geography Research Forum*, 18, 5–18. 1175
- Paasi, A. (2000). Territorial identities as social constructs. *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 1(2), 91–114. 1176–1177
- Peach, C. (1996). The meaning of segregation. *Planning Practice and Research*, 11(2), 137–150. 1178
- Peiris, G. H. (1996). *Development and change in contemporary Sri Lanka: geographical perspectives*. Colombo: Lake House. 1179–1180
- Penrose, J. (2000a). The treatment of marginal groups as a measure of state legitimacy. *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 1(2), 33–62. 1181–1182
- Penrose, J. (2000b). The limitation of nationalist democracy: the treatment of marginal groups as a measure of state legitimacy. *Hagar: International Social Science Review*, 1(2), 33–62. 1183–1184
- Petta, V., & Hallik, K. (2002). Understanding processes of ethnic control: segmentation, co-optation and dependency in post-Communist Estonia. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(4), 505–529. 1185–1186
- Rawls, J. (1999). *The law of peoples*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1187
- Roded, B. (1999). Settlers and frontiers: the Israeli Negev and Sri Lankan Mahaweli. MA Thesis. Department of Geography, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel. 1188–1189
- Rouhana, N. (1997). *Palestinian citizens in an ethnic Jewish state: identities and conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1190–1191
- Rumley, D. (1999). *The geopolitics of Australia's regional relations*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1192–1193
- Ruutsoo, R. E. (1998). Estonian citizenship policy in a context of emerging nation-state in Heidmets. In Mati (Ed.), *Russian minority and challenges for Estonia* (pp. 139–202). Tallinn: TPÜ (in Estonian). 1194–1195
- Sack, R. (1993). The power of place and space. *Geographical Review*, 83, 326–329. 1196
- Sassen, S. (1998). *Globalization and its discontents*. New York: Wiley and Sons. 1197
- Sasoon, A. S. (1987). *Gramsci's politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1198
- Shafir, G., & Peled, Y. (2002). *Being an Israeli: the politics of citizenship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1199–1200
- Shilhav, Y. (1991). *A Shtetl (small town) within a modern city—a geography of segregation and acceptance*. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. 1201–1202
- Sibley, D. (1996). *Geographies of exclusion*. London: Routledge. 1203
- Smith, A. (2002a). Dating the nation. In D. Conversi (Ed.), *Walker Connor and the study of nationalism* (pp. 33–54). London: Routledge. 1204–1205

- Smith, A. (2002b). When is the nation? *Geopolitics*, 7(2), 5–33. 1206
- Smith, A. D. (1995). *Nations and nationalism in a global era*. Cambridge: Polity. 1207
- Smootha, S. (2002a). The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. *Nation and Nationalism*, 8(4), 475–503. 1208
1209
- Smootha, S. (2002b). Types of democracy and modes of conflict management in ethnically divided societies. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(4), 423–431. 1210
1211
- Soyсал, Y. (2000). Citizenship and identity: living is diasporas in post-war Europe? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(1), 1–15. 1212
1213
- Soyсал, Y. N. (1994). *Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1214
1215
- Stasiulis, D., & Yuval-Davis, N. (Eds.). (1995). *Unsettling settler societies: articulations of gender, race, ethnicity and class*. London: Sage. 1216
1217
- Stump, R. (2000). *Boundaries of faith*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 1218
- Taylor, P. (1995). Beyond containers: internationality, interstateness, interterritoriality. *Progress in Human Geography*, 19(1), 1–15. 1219
1220
- Theile, C. (1999). *The criterion of citizenship for minorities: the example of Estonia*. ECMI Working Paper #5. 1221
1222
- Uyangoda, J. (1994). The state and the process of devolution in Sri-Lanka. In S. Bastian (Ed.), *Devolution and development in Sri Lanka* (pp. 83–121). Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies. 1223
1224
1225
- Winichakul, T. (1994). *Siam mapped: a history of a geo-body of a nation*. Bangkok: University of Hawaii Press. 1226
1227
- Yacobi, H., & Yiftachel, O. (2003). Urban ethnocracy: ethnicization and the production of space in an Israeli 'mixed' city. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 21(3), 322–343. 1228
1229
- Yiftachel, O. (1998). Nation-building and the social division of space: Ashkenazi dominance in the Israeli 'ethnocracy'. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 4(3), 33–58. 1230
1231
- Yiftachel, O. (1999). Ethnocracy: the politics of judaizing Israel/Palestine. *Constellations*, 6(3), 364–390. 1232
- Yiftachel, O. (2000). Ethnocracy and its discontents: minorities, protest and the Israeli polity. *Critical Inquiry*, 26(4), 725–756. 1233
1234
- Yiftachel, O. (2002). Territory as the kernel of nationalism. *Geopolitics*, 7(3), 215–248. 1235
- Yiftachel, O., & Kedar, S. (2000). Landed power: the emergence of an ethnocratic land regime in Israel. *Teorya Uvikkoret (Theory and Critique)*, 19(1), 67–100. 1236
1237
- Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign affairs*, 76(6), 22–43. 1238