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Solutions: One State, Two State, None
Zalman Amit & Daphna Levit
Notes on a conflict #7, 16 Mar 2009
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There is little doubt that lately the hottest buzzwords in the Middle East “peace vocabulary” are Two State Solution (TSS) and the newer concept of One State Solution (OSS).

Anyone involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has encountered the TSS words. The concept is, however, not new and it is a “many splendid things” concept. It means entirely different things to different people and many are convinced that neither TSS nor OSS is a viable concept anymore. Thus “None” may best reflect reality today.

The birth of the TSS concept can be traced to the early years of the 20th Century. The Zionist Movement painfully realized that Zangwill’s depiction of Palestine, as “a people without a land for a land without people” is inaccurate and unrealistic. The mythical/biblical homeland was not empty. Living there in towns and villages were people who considered the place their home and were not about to give it away to foreign newcomers.

In recognition of this dilemma Zionist leaders such as Herzl and Nordau initially contemplated seeking another place for the establishment of the Jewish Homeland. The idea was to relocate the Jewish homeland to Uganda. This concept never took roots since the large Russian contingent in the Zionist movement, headed by Usishkin, vehemently opposed it and was quite willing to split the movement on the issue.

The efforts to establish a homeland for the Jews led to another solution: “Partition”, to divide the land between the inhabitants and the European Jews. Preliminary references to this notion can be found in the Balfour Declaration (1917), which was cast in the best colonial tradition and promised support to the Jews for a “Jewish Home Land”. It also clearly recognized and promised to protect the rights of the inhabitants of the land.

The British Government must not have thought deeply enough about the precise implications of their proposal. In retrospect, some form of TSS was the only possible interpretation of the Declaration.

Whereas the area west of the Jordan River was given to Britain as a mandate from The League of Nations, the Arab population did not accept the Balfour Declaration. The “Great Arab Rebellion” that began shortly after Britain assumed its role as the Mandatory Government of the area and continued in one form or another until 1939 was largely triggered by this “divide and conquer” colonial maneuver.

At the Biltmore Conference (1942) the notion emerged that the only way to implement the dream of a Jewish Sovereign homeland was through some form of “Partition” despite ferocious opposition from some. The Zionist leaders were committed to the greatest possible expansion of the Jewish side of the Partition. Ben Gurion’s Strategy all along was to appear a reasonable pragmatist who accepts the Partition but, at the same time, to seize any opportunity to push the boundaries of the future Jewish state constantly Eastward.

After a hiatus during World War II, efforts to achieve independence resumed with renewed vigor. The circumstances in the immediate post-war period could not have been better for the Zionist leadership. The world was stunned by revelation of the Holocaust and the super powers competed with one another in supporting the nascent Jewish state.

Britain, devastated by the war, announced its intention to return its Palestine Mandate to the UN. A UN commission was established to make recommendations to the UN General Assembly following the termination of the British mandate. Not surprisingly, it recommended a Partition of the territory West of the Jordan River into two states. What was surprising was the unjust proposal to allot 56% of the territory to the Jews who accounted then for only 33% of the population. The Arabs representing two thirds of the population were allotted only 44% of the territory. This development delighted the Jewish leadership but assured an Arab rejection of the partition proposal and the launching of an all out war by the sovereign neighboring Arabs states.

The war of 1948 (The War of Independence for the Jews and the Naqba or Catastrophe for the Arabs) ended in 1949 with a decisive Israeli victory. Towards the end of 1949 the warring parties, chaperoned by the UN Under Secretary General Ralph Bunch, gathered on the Island of Rhodes and signed an Armistice Agreement. Maps documenting the agreement show Israel emerging from the war with 78% of the Territory rather than the 56% that was initially allotted to it. This outcome illustrated Ben Gurion’s strategy: to appear reasonable but not to miss any opportunity for expansion.

The remaining 22% of Mandatory Palestine comprised what is now known as the West Bank and Gaza; the former was annexed by Jordan and the latter by Egypt. These countries thereby demonstrated no particular commitment to assist the independence of the Palestinians and were quite happy to expand their own territories.

An argument could be advanced that from 1949 to 1967 the first version of the TSS was implemented in Palestine. But throughout this process the actual inhabitants of Palestine were never consulted. Two Arab governments now ruled over the original inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza as well as over the many thousands of refugees who moved there following their expulsion from what was now the State of Israel.

This state of affairs ended abruptly in 1967 with the dramatic Israeli victory at the end of an unnecessary war triggered by Israel. The outcome of this war was that Israel controlled the entire area West of the Jordan River and vast areas conquered from Egypt and Syria. Euphoria among the Israelis after the war stemmed from the belief that the state of belligerence was ending and some form of the TSS was about to be established in Palestine.

Within days after the war Israel annexed East Jerusalem although the UN had designated Jerusalem as an ex-territorial international city. This illegal move was quickly followed by the destruction of the Mugrabi neighborhood in front of the Wailing Wall and the expulsion of the entire population of this ancient neighborhood to allow the formation of the huge plaza in front of The Wall.

Probably more momentous was the founding of the first settlements in the West Bank. The leaders of the ruling Labour Party seemed to be eager to support the establishment of settlements with people who were always antagonistic to the sponsoring Labour Party. In the years after the 1967 war the settlement movement, reinforced by the government, greatly prospered. Along the Green Line, in places like Karnei Shomron or Modi’in Illit, Israelis who never dreamt of having a villa and a back yard could now afford luxury homes at bargain basement prices paying almost no taxes. The result was that the settlements mushroomed.

When the number of settlers reached about 80.000, the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti argued that the situation in the occupied territories had reached a point of no return. He contended that no government in Israel would have the political will to remove 80.000 settlers from their homes in the West Bank. Although Benvenisti did not articulate a specific solution to the new state of affairs, it was clear that the only solution to his notion of irreversibility would be some form of the OSS. Benvenisti’s contention garnered a great deal of scorn both from the Right and the Left. In retrospect it was profoundly prophetic. The number of settlers continued to grow exponentially whereas a string of Israeli governments displayed an ever diminishing will to take any step towards the possibility of a TSS. Even settlements that Israel itself considered illegal (i.e. the outposts) were never actually removed. Instead these settlements often received preferred treatment from local and state authorities and were expanded over more Palestinian Land.

And then came Oslo. For a short time there was optimism that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was about to be resolved. Who doesn’t remember the famous handshake on the lawn of the White House and the hope that it instilled even among the cynics? The photo ops, sadly, did not reflect reality. Settlements continued to grow in number and expand even while the leaders were negotiating peace. There were over 120.000 settlers when the handshake took place. Even Rabin, the Prime Minister who came closest to understanding how to resolve the conflict, did not think in terms of a true TSS. The concept of an independent, sovereign Palestinian State was never mentioned in the Oslo agreements.

Just a few years later Ehud Barak defeated Binyamin Netanyahu and became Prime Minister. Barak’s election campaign claimed that he was Rabin’s heir in vision and in policy. It suggested that Barak would simply finish what Rabin did not: the dismantling of the settlements as a necessary preparation for the implementation of a Two State Solution. The opposite actually happened. During Barak’s short term as Prime Minister the number of settlers doubled. Despite an attempt to reach a premature agreement with Arafat at Camp David 2, Rabin’s heir did not bring the TSS any closer to implementation. Quite the opposite happened, although he insisted that he offered the Palestinians almost everything.


After the failure of both Camp David 2 and Taba, Barak’s days as Prime Minister were numbered. Two years later he was defeated by Ariel Sharon and the Likud. The shift to the right so perceptible in the February elections, actually started with Sharon’s electoral victory.

After the assumption of power by the Likud, Israel’s position actually became clearer. Sharon managed to avoid any negotiations with the Palestinian leadership but there was little difference between him and his successor Ehud Olmert. They shared an identical vision which was not at all dissimilar to that held by Barak.

Cynically one could argue that Barak, Sharon and Olmert, as well as the two current potential Prime Ministers Livni and Netanyahu, all supported some form of TSS. They all agree that the vast majority of settlements must remain intact and annexed to Israel. The Separation Wall/Fence and all the land between it and the Green Line must also be annexed to Israel. This means that 11% to 18% of the West Bank will be carved out and annexed to Israel, leaving the Palestinians with four separate Bantustans that would be connected to one another by roads supervised by Israel. This would realistically leave the Palestinians with about 12%-16% instead of the 22% of the area of Mandatory Palestine that Arafat agreed to accept. The new Palestinian state would be disarmed and Israel would control, among other things, the air, the sea and the aquifers, as well as the roads connecting the enclaves.

Any analysis of the Israeli position shows that such a Palestinian State is not viable and, more importantly, not sovereign. No Palestinian leader in his right mind, neither Fatah nor Hamnas , could accept such a humiliation and successfully sell it to the Palestinian people. Clearly the ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority are a sham where both sides know that no agreement acceptable to either is in the offing.

A growing realization that there is no acceptable agreement has surprisingly led to an increase on both sides of the conflict for consideration of the option of a OSS: one state West of the Jordan River in which all residents will be citizens. Dr. Sari Nuseiba, the president of Al-Kuds University and a known moderate, expressed this view most convincingly by saying “It is too late for the Two State Solution”. Alas lack of support for this notion among the Palestinian and Israeli rank and file makes this proposal totally non-viable. With about 500.000 settlers (Settlement Watch estimates that 73.000 residential units will be built in the West Bank this year) and the current split between Fatah and Hamas, the Israeli rejection of any TSS solution leads to the inevitable conclusion that prospects for a TSS solution are no better than those for a OSS. Despite lip service by some leaders on both sides, the Palestinian Israeli conflict is not going to be resolved in the near future.

The only possible change in this ongoing deadlock would be a hypothetical situation where the world would impose a solution: The US alone, the US and the EU, The Quartet or some combination would base a solution on available and recognized UN resolutions over the warring parties. Unfortunately, the political reality today is such that this is no more likely than the two solutions we have just discussed.

Thus: TSS or OSS but most probably NONE.


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