The dramatic August 13 announcement that the UAE and Israel would begin the
process of fully normalizing all of their relations is both a significant
blow and a sudden lifeline to a two-state solution between Israel and the
Palestinians. That sounds paradoxical, but how the agreement impacts chances
for a two-state solution will be entirely determined by the broader context
in which it plays out in the coming years. To understand this paradox, let`s
begin with why the two sides made the agreement, and why they did it now.
The immediate context was the looming threat of a large-scale Israeli
annexation in the occupied West Bank. The Trump administration’s `Peace to
Prosperity` proposal issued in January contemplated Israel annexing up to
30% of the occupied West Bank beyond the already de facto annexed East
Jerusalem, including almost all Israeli settlements and the strategically
crucial Jordan Valley. Any such move would permanently foreclose the
prospect of a viable two-state solution because it would render any
potential Palestinian state politically and economically nonviable and
entirely surrounded by a greater Israeli state. There is no prospect of any
Palestinian leadership accepting such an arrangement under almost any
circumstances.
But even a more modest de facto annexation, such as the extension of
Israel`s civil law (as was done in East Jerusalem) into major settlement
blocs such as Ma’ale Adumim, Gush Etzion and even Ariel, would have
effectively rendered Palestinian statehood territorially and politically
unacceptable from a Palestinian point of view. And it would have established
annexation, presumably with US support, as the new Israeli approach to the
occupied territories, unilaterally and dramatically abrogating and indeed
nullifying the basic Oslo agreements, particularly the 1993 Declaration of
Principles which establishes the agreed-upon framework for negotiations and
enumerates the final status issues.
Having vowed to immediately begin the process of annexation on July 1, as
permitted under his coalition agreement with Benny Gantz, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu seemed poised to act quickly this summer. However, a
number of factors, including the coronavirus pandemic and quiet calls for
delay and restraint from Washington, left him looking for a way out. The UAE
– which had long contemplated a closer partnership with Israel to counter
Iran and Turkey and to partner on technology and commerce – saw an
opportunity. Having urged the Israeli public, directly, respectfully and in
Hebrew in Israeli newspapers, UAE officials began an intensive dialogue with
Israel in June, ostensibly brokered by the Trump administration.
The aspect of the agreement that provides an unexpected lifeline to
prospects for a two-state solution is Israel`s agreement to hold off on any
possible annexation. Netanyahu assured the Israeli right that he had only
agreed to a temporary pause, but both the UAE and Donald Trump have strongly
indicated that annexation is, in fact, `off the table` for the foreseeable
future. Israel would clearly be potentially placing the agreement at risk if
it moves forward with annexation anytime soon, and most Israelis seem to
prefer the deal over annexation. And, why wouldn`t they? The agreement with
the UAE arguably only formalizes an existing reality, but so would
annexation. Annexation wouldn`t gain Israel anything it doesn`t already have
in effect, and it would come at a considerable cost. Normalization with the
UAE, on the other hand, has potentially very significant strategic and
commercial benefits for both sides in the coming years given that only
limited forms of cooperation can be effectively conducted behind the scenes.
Now, the sky’s the limit for the two most technologically sophisticated and
ambitious Middle Eastern countries.
If annexation really would have been the ultimate, almost irreversible final
blow to a two-state solution, placing what increasingly looks like a semi-
permanent freeze (especially if Joe Biden wins US election in November) on
the process logically must have salvaged the potential for such an eventual
agreement, no matter how remote it may seem at the moment.
On the other hand, Palestinian outrage is certainly understandable. The UAE
has just shattered the main leverage they believed they still had with
Israel: the Arab consensus that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) defined
the basis for any additional Arab diplomatic outreach to Israel. The API
proposes full normalization between Israel and the entire Arab world, and,
given its later adoption by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation,
virtually the entire Islamic world as well, in the event of a two-state
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Over time, the API was amended to
include the possibility of mutually-agreed land swaps. In recent years, the
understanding even grew that these could be implemented over time, with
significant Israeli moves towards ending the occupation or ameliorating
conditions for Palestinians on the ground met with limited Arab diplomatic
outreach to Israel that set the stage for eventual normalization.
However, the UAE`s agreement to move forward with normalization not only in
the absence of any progress towards ending the occupation but, rather, to
forestall annexation the Palestinians regard as outright theft – a move
Israel not only had not taken but was moving away from – appears to the
Palestinians to remove their last significant nonviolent leverage over
Israel other than the mere fact of their continued existence. Given that the
API had increasingly come to be the bedrock of the Palestinian’s own
diplomatic position, the extent of the disaster for the Palestine Liberation
Organization is hard to overstate.
But there`s another way of looking at it. Because so much activity was going
on between Israel and several Gulf Arab countries, including not only the
UAE but also Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and even Saudi Arabia, arguably the API
was simply a comforting illusion for Palestinians. If the commitment to the
agreement by Gulf countries and others, such as Sudan and, perhaps, Morocco,
was a convenient fiction, perhaps it`s better to dispense with deception and
self-deception. Moreover, history suggests that the two Arab countries (the
complex case of Mauritania excluded) which have diplomatic relations with
Israel, Egypt and Jordan, have been far better able to cure specific
Palestinian interests on the ground, including in Gaza, than Arab states
that keep Israel at arm`s distance.
Some other Arab countries are likely to follow suit, most notably Bahrain
and Oman, probably Sudan and possibly Morocco. The big prize, Saudi Arabia,
will probably not even consider such a step as long as King Salman, who is
committed to the API and the imperative of Palestinian statehood, remains on
the throne. When and if his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, ascends
to the throne, a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement might be imaginable,
particularly given a shift in generational thinking and much of the Arab
world regarding Israel, depending on a wide variety of regional
circumstances. Saudi Arabia has a far broader set of strategic
considerations and political and diplomatic vulnerabilities than any of
these other countries, and the strategic equation for Riyadh may or may not
make sense when the time comes.
The UAE-Israel normalization process may lead some other Arab countries to
follow suit, but not very many for now. It seems to pull the rug out from
under the Palestinian’s diplomatic and strategic calculations, but it
seemingly preserves the potential for a two-state solution into the
foreseeable future. And, if it`s so inclined, the UAE is now much better
positioned to negotiate on behalf of policy and interests with Israel than
it was before. Whether this is a net plus or minus for peace between Israel
and the Palestinians must therefore be considered an entirely open question.
The above is an exclusive analysis written for the Two-State Index of the
Geneva Intiative.
Hussein Ibish is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute
in Washington. He is a weekly columnist for Bloomberg and The National
(UAE), and many of his articles are archived on his Ibishblog website. Ibish
previously served as a senior fellow at the American Task Force on
Palestine.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or positions of
H.L. Education for Peace-GI or the Palestinian Peace Coalition-GI.
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